The transition from state socialist economies to market-oriented economies in Eastern Europe and China has created much debate among sociologists in recent times (Bian & Logan 1996; Cao & Nee 2000; Griffin & Zhao 1993; Lin 1995; Nee 1989 Nee , 1991 Nee , 1996 Nee & Cao 1999; Parish & Michelson 1996; Rona-Tas 1994; Szelenyi 1978 Szelenyi , 1983 Szelenyi & Manchin 1987; Szelenyi & Kostello 1996; Walder 1990 Walder , 1996 Xie & Hannum 1996; Zhou 2000a) . State socialism is characterized as an economic system integrated by redistributive mechanisms, whereas capitalism 
is a market-integrated economic system (Szelenyi 1978 (Szelenyi , 1983 . Since social inequalities are always generated by the dominant mode of economic integration, the institutional transformation of state socialism has provided a unique opportunity for sociologists to examine how institutions shape the order of social stratification and how the change has influenced social inequality. This article examines the roles played by the concrete institutions of various work units in shaping income inequality in urban China during the market transition.
The Market Transition Debate
Market transition theory suggests that market-oriented reforms in state socialist countries have been increasing returns to human capital and causing the decline of the influence of redistributive power. According to Szelenyi (1978 Szelenyi ( , 1983 , inequalities under one system can be reduced by introducing the alternative as a counterbalancing mechanism. Thus, the penetration by market factors will undermine the socialist inequality created by redistribution. However, with the market becoming an influential, or even dominant, mechanism, it will eventually lead to inequality. Parallel to Szelenyi's theoretical argument, Nee (1989) proposed several theses about the effect of the transition to the market based on empirical evidence from rural China. He found that overall income inequality declined in China from 1977 to 1985. The income gap between urban and rural residents decreased, as did the gap between peasants and cadres within rural society. During this transition period, direct producers (ordinary workers and peasants) gained more and human capital was rewarded more, whereas political loyalty came to matter less. Meanwhile, income inequality in urban China exhibited distinctive patterns in the state and the market sectors: there were higher returns to human capital (education and work experience) in the market sector than in the state sector, while advantages enjoyed by administrators were found only in the state sector. In the market sector, Communist party membership had even become a disadvantage (Nee & Cao 1995) .
Findings based on other urban data, however, are inconsistent with market transition theory (Bian & Logan 1996; Xie & Hannum 1996) . First, the decline of overall income inequality cannot be conclusively attributed to the effect of marketization. Despite the equalizing trend in income distribution from 1978 to 1988, Bian and Logan found that equalization was more pronounced for base salaries than for bonuses. Since base salaries were subject to government regulation, the equalizing trend in income inequality was largely the result of government policy rather than market penetration (Bian & Logan 1996 , also see Griffin & Zhao 1993) . Second, claims about the effects of redistributive power and human capital are particularly controversial. On the one hand, greater increases in income for party members, workers in the state sector, and workers holding jobs with a redistributive nature than for other workers suggest that redistributive influences were strengthened during the market-oriented reform (Bian & Logan 1996) . On the other hand, returns to education were found to be negatively associated with the level of marketization (Xie & Hannum 1996) . Thus, predictions about the declining significance of redistributive power and increasing returns to human capital in the market transition were largely unsupported, at least in urban China.
Some of the variations in findings among these studies can be explained by specifying the institutional settings within which marketization is embedded (Szelenyi & Kostello 1996) . Since the results contradicting market transition theory are exclusively based on urban areas, whereas Nee's claims were originally grounded on evidence from rural areas, most scholars speculated that the inconsistencies were due to the differences in institutions and reform strategies between urban society and rural society. The work unit, as one of the most important institutions that characterize Chinese urban society (Walder 1986; Whyte & Parish 1984) , accordingly, has been of particular interest to scholars in accounting for urban inequality. For example, Xie and Hannum (1996) speculated that the marketoriented reforms of the 1980s resulted in increasing inequalities among work units in terms of bonuses. And Bian and Logan (1996) showed that the effects of redistributive characteristics of work units on income inequality increased over the period of the market-oriented reform.
Empirical evidence regarding the effects of the work unit and its way of distributing bonuses, however, is not completely unfavorable to market transition theory. In a study of Tianjin, Walder (1990) examined the determination of base salary and bonuses separately. While base salaries were hierarchically distributed, bonuses were allocated more equally. After adding bonuses to base salaries, the effects of work experience and education on total income decreased, and the impact of work-unit ownership and bureaucratic rank on total income was strengthened. However, the advantages that party members and cadres enjoyed in base salaries disappeared in total income after equally distributed bonuses were added to base salaries. If bonuses were viewed as one way of representing the impact of reform on income inequality (Walder 1990 ), these findings suggested that returns to human capital (education and work experience) were reduced and that redistributive advantages (due to work-unit rank and ownership) persisted in the course of market transition. On the other hand, they provided some confirmation of Nee's hypotheses (1989) that the reform decreased the influence of redistributive power (party membership) and returned more to direct producers (ordinary workers).
Resolution of these conflicting interpretations, however, has been hampered by the fact that, despite general acknowledgment of the central role of work units in urban stratification, the changing impact of the specific characteristics of work units has not been directly and fully examined. Xie and Hannum (1996) speculated that the work unit played a pivotal role in reducing returns to human capital, but, nevertheless, did not include work-unit variables in their analysis. While Walder (1990 Walder ( , 1992 , Bian (1994) , and Bian and Logan (1996) considered work units' ownership and bureaucratic rank in their analyses, work units' attributes that are key to employees' earnings were not examined. In addition, most data were only from work units in the state sector, limiting the generalizability of the findings.
A direct examination of the role of work units in income determination is necessary in order to address the original question of whether institutional changes cause changes in social stratification. While the market is viewed as a generic institutional force that reshapes the social stratification order (Nee 1989 (Nee , 1991 Szelenyi 1978; Szelenyi & Kostello 1996) , the work unit is a specific institution through which the market exerts its influence on urban social inequality. To explore the social consequences of market-oriented economic reform, we need to consider the effect of marketization on the work unit, i.e., how marketization has changed the work unit's influence on stratification (Guthrie 1997; Oberschall 1996; Zhou & Pei 1997) .
In this article I examine economic inequality among employees in various work units during the market transition period in urban China. In a system such as China's, where a substantial portion of rewards were distributed in nonmonetary form, income may not be the best indicator of social stratification (Oberschall 1996; Walder 1992; Zhou, Tuma & Moen 1997) . However, I focus on income determination for three reasons. First, this article is intended as a contribution to the market transition debate. The use of income as my dependent variable makes it possible to compare my results to previous findings, and in particular to assess the role of work units, thereby helping to reconcile the disparities summarized above. Second, in overall economic rewards nonwage welfare might be important, especially in the state sector, but because we are looking at relative advantages in income associated with different positions, and because income and nonmonetary benefits are positively correlated, income is still a valid indicator of socioeconomic status. Third, in the reform era, cash income has become a major part of economic rewards, mainly in the form of bonuses, which are more sensitive to economic change than either base income or, especially, perquisites. Thus, studying income determination can shed light on the institutional transition in China.
My work here has two interrelated purposes. By taking into account the effect of work units -following the core issue in the market transition controversy -I address the question of whether the influence of redistributive power has declined and whether returns to human capital have increased. On the other hand, I demonstrate the importance of work units in understanding the process of market transition in China and expand this arena for institutional analysis. In the following sections I first describe the work unit's key role in social stratification in state socialist China as well as the impact of marketization on the work unit. Then, I show how the work unit affects an individual's income and specifically how the work unit modifies returns to human capital in different institutional settings.
After sketching out different scenarios of income determination among work units, I assess the implications for the market transition debate. Finally, I reflect on the market transition debate as a whole, and discuss possible future directions for studying institutional transitions in current and former state socialist societies.
The Work Unit As a Social Institution in Chinese Urban Society
Prior to the economic reform, almost every urban resident in China was assigned to a workplace, whether a factory, store, school, or government office, called a work unit (danwei). In Chinese official statistics, the work unit is defined as an independent accounting unit with three characteristics: (1) administratively, it is an independent organization; (2) fiscally, it has an independent budget and produces its own accounting tables of earnings and deficits; (3) financially, it has independent accounts in banks and has legal rights to sign contracts with government or business entities (Bian 1994) . In general, work units were classified into three categories based on their primary functions: (1) government or party agencies (dangzheng jiguan); (2) profit-making enterprises (qiye danwei), and (3) nonprofit institutions (shiye danwei). Government or party agencies represented the state and assumed the central administrative role in Chinese society, while economic enterprises and nonprofit institutions were owned in varying degree by the state are were administrated directly or indirectly by the government. Since state enterprises accounted for most work units and employed the vast majority of the labor force, 2 studies of work units usually focused on state-owned enterprises (Walder 1986 ). The term work unit (danwei) refers to all work organizations in general, but was often used to refer to state economic enterprises in particular.
Each work unit was an extension of the state organization. First, all work units were affiliated with and supervised by government at various levels ranging from township governments to the national government. Second, managers in work units were appointed and promoted by their supervisory government offices, thus, they were de facto government bureaucrats. Third, there existed no labor market and all employees were assigned to work units by government labor or personnel bureaus. The number of employees and the wage allocation for a work unit were rigidly regulated by the government's annual plans. Finally, activities of work units were also controlled by government offices. All decisions regarding product pricing, as well as allocation of profits, were made by supervising offices, either formally or through informal negotiation between enterprises and the government offices (Li & Wang 1992; Lu 1989; Walder 1986 ).
Due to the lack of autonomy, a work unit's goal was subordinate to that of the state. Work units not only worked towards their specific organizational goals but also carried out responsibilities of the state to its citizens. First, labor insurance and social security provisions were administrated through the work unit. Second, the work unit also directly supplied a range of state goods and services which, in market economies, would be supplied through markets or a variety of institutions and government agencies. In addition, the work unit performed a variety of sociopolitical services and therefore was the locus of a worker's social and political identity (Walder 1986) . In sum, the work unit was the basic cell of Chinese urban society and the crucial vehicle of social administration and social control (Li & Wang 1992; Lu 1989; Oberschall 1996; Walder 1986) .
The resources that a work unit could offer to its employees were contingent upon its structural position in the socialist hierarchy. Resources at a work unit's disposal varied with its type. Government and party agencies were de facto redistributors under the state socialist system, and enterprises were required to submit all profits to the central planners. In addition, ownership was one of the most important factors in resource distribution. The redistributive system tended to favor state-owned work units because they were considered the base of the communist regime. State-owned work units had priority when acquiring resources from the government from which to provide housing and subsidized grain coupons to their employees. Finally, each work unit had a rank in the hierarchy, which could strengthen the work unit's ability to gain resources from the state. The higher the rank of a work unit, the more power it had in bargaining with its government supervisor (Bian 1994; Li & Wang 1992) .
Remuneration provided by the work unit included salary and in-kind goods and services. After the 1956 wage reform, the salaries of employees were under rigid government control (Walder 1986) . Each employee had a rank in the wage ladder based on his or her personal status, seniority, and administrative position. This so-called "one China, one payroll table" policy applied regardless of variation among work units. However, living standards and economic status in China could not be measured only in monetary terms. In an economy of scarcity, in-kind goods and services only available through the work unit were important as well. The work unit played a central role in the distribution of housing and ration coupons and the delivery of a wide range of services. Walder (1992) explored the impact of ownership and budgetary rank on social stratification at the organizational level. He argued that the extraction of revenues from work organizations varied with the budgetary resources of the governing jurisdiction and the dependence of that jurisdiction on the output of the organization. Variation in revenue extraction, in turn, created inequalities among organizations in terms of their ability to provide nonmonetary benefits to employees.
In a typical redistribution process, the state first appropriated and monopolized resources and opportunities and then allocated them to work units according to their positions in the redistributive hierarchy. In turn, work units distributed rewards on the basis of a worker's individual attributes. This mechanism gave the work unit primacy in determining the income and status attainment of its workers (Bian 1994; Lin & Bian 1991) .
The Work Unit and Income Distribution during the Reform Era
The scenario depicted above had been changing since the early 1980s when urban economic reform was initiated. Urban economic reform resulted in the emergence of a new market-oriented economy. Self-employment and private economic activity had been legitimized as integral parts of socialism since 1982. Meanwhile, an opendoor policy was attracting a large amount of foreign investment (Zhong 1990) . In 1995, the nonstate economy accounted for 23% of industrial gross output value and 29% of national investment (State Statistical Bureau 1996) . 3 These firms constituted an expanding market sector outside the redistributive economy. Since the market sector was becoming a new provider of resources and life chances other than those offered by the state sector, bureaucratic coordination became less important than before. Moreover, as marketization proceeded, new firms gained economic advantages and pushed many state firms into marginal positions in market competition. The privileges that state enterprises used to enjoy in a homogeneously redistributive economy were fading away (McMillan & Naughton 1993; Naughton 1999) .
Meanwhile, work units in the state sector had obtained some decision-making power from the government. The restructuring of the enterprise-government relationship was a pivotal issue on the agenda of China's economic reform. Though significant changes occurred slowly over many years, the incremental decentralization policy enabled enterprises eventually to evolve into entities with relative autonomy (McMillan & Naughton 1993; Shirk 1994) . In 1985, the number of industrial products allocated by central planning was reduced from some 600 items to 310 (Bian & Logan 1996) . By 1992, the prices of over 80% of commodities were determined by the market rather than by government planning (Li 1993) .
Although some work units continued to take advantage of redistributive mechanisms, they had to confront market competition as well. The business performance of a state firm was contingent not only on its organizational status in the hierarchy, but also on its success in adjusting to the market. In this context, two trends were observed with respect to income distribution in reforming China (Li 1989; Zhao 1993) . On the one hand, income disparities across work units were growing; on the other hand, inequalities within work units remained small and may even have decreased. Earnings may vary significantly among people with the same level of education working at the same occupations solely because of their different organizational affiliations. A young man with four years of work experience might earn much more than his father who held a similar job and had forty years of work experience, simply because they were affiliated with different work units (National Information Center 1997) .
This irony may be understood in terms of the effect of marketization on the work unit. Market-oriented economic reforms widened the income gap between employees in different work units. Interorganizational inequality may be attributed substantially to the emergence of a market sector. Firms in the market sector tended to be more efficient and profitable than their state counterparts. As a result, employees in the market sector were more likely to receive high wages than employees in the state sector. Indeed, in 1991 the average monthly wage was 60% higher in the market sector than in the state sector; comparable figures for 1993 and 1995 were 62% and 55%, respectively (State Statistical Bureau 1996) . While this gap could be partly due to differences in occupational composition in the two sectors, the differentials in profitability between state firms and market firms also contributed to the gap.
Interorganizational inequality can also be accounted for by the increasing autonomy of work units in the state sector. Among decision-making powers that work units had gained, the most important one was to retain a portion of profit and to distribute the profits at their discretion to employees as bonuses. Accordingly, firms had more incentive to produce profits, and employees had more incentive to work. The retained profits partly went to the welfare fund 4 and partly went directly to bonuses. The welfare fund increased the capacity of work units to provide noncash items and services to their employees, whereas bonuses directly increased employees' monetary incomes. In general, employees have been increasingly rewarded with cash income in the reform era. Bian and Logan (1996) found that base salaries as a percentage of a worker's total income dropped from 95% in 1978 to less than 50% in 1993, indicating that bonuses were now the principal element of total earnings (Bian & Logan 1996) . While base salaries remained largely regulated by the government, the ability to generate bonus funds and to reward employees varied considerably from one work unit to another. Therefore, variation in bonuses (and in-kind benefits) had become a main source of interorganizational inequality (Sun et al. 1994; Zhao 1993) .
Within work units, bonuses are also key to understanding the process of income distribution. Bonuses, which were initially generated as individual incentives, were found to be allocated equally within work units, regardless of individual characteristics (Walder 1990 ). This tendancy was retained even when bonuses became a major part of employees' earnings (Li 1989) . In sum, because of the differential ability of work units to generate bonuses, income inequality among work units became greater during the reform period in China than before. Within work units, on the other hand, bonuses tended to equalize income distribution. As a result, the amount of economic rewards that employees received was largely contingent upon what work unit they were employed by rather than on their personal characteristics, the nature of their job, or how well they performed. In urban China, the effect of the market transition on individuals' income was mediated through their work units and therefore must be gauged within the specific institutional settings of economic work units (firms). 5
Hypotheses
There is some difficulty empirically measuring the contextual effect of the market in determining urban employees' income. Xie and Hannum (1996) adopted the growth of regional industrial output as a proxy to account for the extent of the shift to a market environment. However, specifying a contextual variable at the city level is not sufficient to capture the dominant effect of work units on urban income inequality as described above since there is great heterogeneity among work units within the same locale. Moreover, the measure conflates market-driven economic growth with nonmarket industrial growth in the state sector. In an alternative approach, Nee (1996) measured the market effect by asking respondents whether they participate in the labor market. Though this approach may to some extent capture differences in labor recruitment between the state sector and the market sector, variations in the extent of marketization of the state sector are not captured since labor markets for state employees have been virtually absent until recently. As I have indicated, the market-oriented reforms have exerted influence primarily on work units rather than on individuals in urban China, and thus market effects should be measured at the mesolevel of work units.
Based on the extent of exposure to the market, firms can be classified into three types. Most fundamental are institutional differences between state and market firms. Here state firms are defined to include all state-owned enterprises and some collective enterprises ("large collective enterprises"), while market firms are defined to include the remaining collective enterprises ("small collective enterprises") as well as private enterprises, share-holding enterprises, joint-ventures, and foreign enterprises. Though collective firms are considered publicly owned, they are very heterogeneous, especially since the reform. "Large collective firms" are usually directed by the local government or community and are therefore institutionally similar to state firms. They get substantial assistance from the government and undertake substantial welfare responsibility. In contrast, "small collective firms" receive little protection and assistance from the government and must struggle in the market to survive. Therefore, although in terms of property rights small collective firms may not be strictly private, their operating mechanisms are, indeed, market-oriented.
Market firms must rely on the market to survive, while state firms still enjoy some redistributive advantages. However, state firms are no longer homogeneous. Some of them have gained more autonomy from the government and have become deeply engaged in market activities, whereas others are still under rigid government control. Therefore, conceptually, firms within the state sector can be institutionally divided into two types: redistributive firms and semiredistributive firms.
The reliance of state firms on the market is a latent variable that must be multidimensionally measured with a few observable indicators, of which firm profit is essential. 6 Since semiredistributive firms have more autonomy than fully redistributive firms to engage in market activities while still enjoying their redistributive advantages, they generally show higher profits than do redistributive firms. The high retained profits, in return, consolidate firms' autonomy since financially they may have to rely on government less than they used to. As described above, a part of the retained profits is allocated to employees as bonuses, which are key to understanding the income distribution in Chinese work units. Therefore, firm profit is an appropriate (although certainly not perfect) indicator to distinguish between semidistributive firms and redistributive firms for the specific purpose of addressing the institutional impact of state firms on income inequality. Accordingly, state firms can be categorized into low-profit state firms (LPFs) and high-profit state firms (HPFs). The institutional difference between LPFs and HPFs is that the latter, while continuing to enjoy redistributive advantages, have also successfully adjusted to the market.
One may argue that firm profit is affected not only by firms' exposure to the market but also by many other external conditions such as the industry in which a firm is located, as well as favorable government policies. While a competitive market does not guarantee high profits in general, in a transitional economy such as that of China, state firms closer to markets tend to be more profitable. This is because state firms that can take advantage of both redistribution and markets usually perform better than those isolated from markets. 7 Only through market activities can redistributive advantages be turned into high profits. Vice versa, if industry is controlled -given that industry certainly affects profit -higher profit implies that a firm is closer to the market. Since firm profit is both the outcome of a state firm's reliance on the market and the most important source of employees' earnings, I use profit as an indicator to distinguish between redistributive firms and semiredistributive firms.
Following market transition theory, I formulate the following hypotheses that can be tested with my cross-sectional data assuming that, as I have argued, LPFs, HPFs, and MFs constitute a continuum of proximity to the market:
Hypothesis 1: If a firm is closer to the market, education will have a greater effect on employees' earnings (base salary plus bonuses).
Hypothesis 2: If a firm is closer to the market, work experience will have a greater effect on employees' earnings.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict that human capital (education and work experience) affects employees' earnings more strongly in MFs than in state firms. Within the state sector, education and work experience are expected to have stronger effects in HPFs than in LPFs.
Hypothesis 3: If a firm is closer to the market, an individual employee's administrative position will have less influence on his or her earnings.
Hypothesis 4: If a firm is closer to the market, an individual employee's party membership will have less influence on his or her earnings.
Hypothesis 5: If a firm is closer to the market, the firm's bureaucratic rank will have less effect on employees' earnings. An employee's party membership and administrative position are proxies for redistributive power at the individual level, while the bureaucratic rank of the firm represents the influence of redistributive power at the work-unit level. While most previous research has focused on either party membership or individual's administrative rank, or both, this article introduces an additional factor at the organizational level to capture the effect of redistributive power on the well-being of individuals. Based on my previous discussion of the central role of work units in Chinese urban society, I suggest that the status of organizations that employees are affiliated with creates great advantages with respect to income and other benefits. Hence, the redistributive nature of work-unit organizations is measured by both ownership type and bureaucratic rank. According to hypotheses 3, 4 and 5, an individual's party membership, administrative position, and firm bureaucratic rank will have smaller effects on earnings in MFs than in state firms. Within state firms, the effect of party membership, administrative position and firm's bureaucratic rank will also be smaller for employees in HPFs than in LPFs.
Hypothesis 6: If a firm is more profitable, its employees will have higher earnings.
Within the state sector, employees' earnings are closely linked to the business performance of their work units. The higher the profits a firm earns, the more resources it can retain at its disposal. As a result, employees may receive more bonuses and subsidies. In market firms, which usually are more profitable than state firms, all rewards that employees receive have to come from firm profits. Therefore, firm profits are expected to be positively associated with employees' earnings, net of other factors.
Data, Variables, Methodology, and Models

DATA
This research is based on two data sets both collected in 1993 in China. One is from a multistage representative survey of Chinese workers and their work units, implemented through the Chinese National Research Center for Science and Technology for Development; the other is from a survey of housing and social stratification in Tianjin. As part of the first project, about 10 work units were first randomly sampled in each of 10 cities, then about 30 employees were randomly sampled from each of these work units. 8 This yielded 3000 employees at 107 Chinese work units (for details on the research design, see , but only the 50 economic work units sampled are used in this analysis, which means that the sample of individuals is reduced to 1,499.
Compared with data sets that have been used in preceding studies, this data set has many advantages. First, it contains key measurements of organizational variables, such as ownership and firm profit. Because the survey measured firm profit, it is possible to categorize state firms in terms of their profitability in order to look at variations within the state sector. Second, there are relatively more employees in the market sector in this data set than in others. The sample includes 218 individuals in 10 market firms; this acounts for 14.5% of sampled employees and 20% of sampled work units. This sample differs from both Xie and Hannum (1996) and Bian and Logan (1996) , where the number of cases from the market sector is negligible (less than 3%). Third, although the sample size is not as large as would be optimal due to financial constraints, it has the benefit of being a multicity survey. 9 Finally, since 1991-92 was a key period in the process of China's economic reform because a new round of marketization was initiated, data collected in 1993 are more adequate than data from the 1980s for examining the depth of current market penetration.
The weakness of this data set is that bonuses were not measured separately from base salaries. Because bonuses are fairly important in understanding the effects of marketization on the work unit, to account for their role in total income distribution within state firms, I use a second data set, restricted to state firms, collected in Tianjin by Bian and Logan in 1993 . These data are from an individual household survey, containing separate measurements of bonuses and base salaries, as well as other variables comparable to those in the first data set.
VARIABLES
Both data sets include measurements of individuals' annual income in yuan earned from their work unit in the previous year (1 yuan = U.S. $0.12). I use the logarithm of annual income as the dependent variable in the OLS regression analysis.
The independent variables include both individual characteristics and organizational characteristics. On the individual level, education and work experience are important indicators of human capital, pertinent to hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2. Years of employment, denoting work experience, is a continuous variable. Education is measured by five categories corresponding to the level of the degree attained (1 = primary school or less; 2 = junior middle school; 3 = senior middle school; 4 = three-year college; 5 = four-year college or more). In the analysis, education is treated as a set of dummy variables. Since there are relatively few cases with low levels of education, I collapsed primary school and junior high school in the first data set. Generally, employees with more work experience and education are expected to have higher earnings than those with less work experience and lower education. Party membership is coded as a dummy variable. Individual administrative position, pertaining to hypothesis 4, was originally measured by four levels (1 = below department; 2 = department; 3 = division; 4 = bureau or above). Because so few high-rank cadres were included in the sample, I recoded administrative position as a dummy variable (those at the rank of department or above are scored 1 and others are scored 0). Gender is included as a control variable, with males scored 1 and females scored 0.
On the organizational level, ownership is one of the critical criteria that institutionally differentiate work units. The distinctions between state firms and market firms are much larger than between different forms of state ownership. State and collective firms share redistributive characteristics in many aspects, while the emergence of market firms is an outcome of economic reforms. To capture the difference between market and redistribution, ownership is coded as a dummy variable: state versus market firms.
Firm bureaucratic rank in hypothesis 5 is another crucial variable that characterizes the redistributive status of a work unit. Work-unit rank is measured in four ordinal levels with a value from 1 to 4 (1 = below department; 2 = department; 3 = division; 4 = bureau or above). As previously pointed out, employees in high-rank work units have advantages with respect to salaries as well as to in-kind benefits in socialist redistributive economies. In hypothesis 6, firm profit is measured by profit per capita in the preceding year, i.e., gross profit divided by the total number of employees. This information was reported by the firm's financial department. Though it is true that some private firms may misreport their earnings in order to avoid tax, it should not lead us to doubt the reliability of the measurement of profit for most firms. Moreover, interviewers explained that the survey data were collected for the purpose of academic research and that all information would be kept confidential. Therefore the potential problem of misreporting was further reduced.
The industry in which a firm is located is introduced as a control variable since firm profitability may vary across industries. Industry is coded as a dummy variable (1 = manufacturing, 0 = others). As I argued above, net of the effect of industry, a state firm's profitability may be taken as reflecting its exposure to the market. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of all variables.
By dividing state firms into LPFs and HPFs at the mean profit per capita, means and standard deviations of earnings can be calculated for all three types of work units. In Figure 1 , employees' average earnings are highest in MFs and, in consequence, lowest in LPFs. However, the standard deviations fail to follow the same pattern. HPFs, instead, have the least income variation among their employees.
To indicate overall income inequality, Gini coefficients are calculated as well, separately for each type of firm. The overall Gini coefficient is .223, while for LPFs, HPFs, and MFs, the coefficients are .230, .163, and .269, respectively. Market firms have higher income inequality than state firms. However, it is noteworthy that income inequality in LPFs is higher than in HPFs. With increasing proximity to the market, overall income inequality does not monotonically increase. 10
METHODOLOGY AND MODELS
As noted above, in the ten-city data set work units were sampled and then employees were randomly sampled within work units (Li & Wang 1993; . This means that observations are clustered. To compute correct standard errors, I use OLS regression with a Huber correction (STATA Corp. 1996). 11 In the following analysis, I first examine the effects of individual characteristics on income distribution as a baseline model (Table 2 , model 1). 12 Then in model 2 of Table 2 , the organizational variables are controlled. Model 3 of Table 2 shows differences between state and market firms with an interaction term between individual characteristics and ownership. In Table 3 , I further examine the role of firm profit in modifying the effect of individual characteristics on income within state firms, controlling industry. 13 Finally, to account for the role of bonuses in income inequality within the state sector, I use the second data set from the Tianjin survey to decompose employees' total income into two parts, following Xie and Hannum (1996) . 14 In state firms, an employee's total income (Y ) equals base salary (Y 1 ) plus bonus (Y 2 ), therefore, In equation 1, S is the logarithm of base salary and B is the logarithm of the transformation of the proportion the bonus contributes to total income. This decomposition has several advantages. First, bonuses (Y 2 ) can be 0, which means that the total income is equivalent to the base salary, and the contribution of bonuses to total income is 0. Second, it is the proportion the bonus contributes to the total income rather than the size of the bonus per se that is of concern. Finally, this formula makes it possible to decompose the effects of specific variables on total income and to determine how much is due to their respective effects on base salaries and bonuses. Table 2 presents the results of three models of the determinants of the natural log of income, based on the ten-city data with standard errors adjusted for clustering. In model 1, in which only individual predictors are included, the effects of both education and work experience are highly significant, while administrative position and party membership have no effect at all. As is generally true, men earn more than otherwise similar women. In model 2, organizational variables are included. As a result, although the effect of senior high school education becomes only marginally significant, postsecondary education still has advantages. Three-year college graduates earn 25.4% (= e 0.226 -1), and four-year college graduates earn 42.5% (= e 0.354 -1), more than do those with junior high school or less education, net of other factors. A Wald test shows that the joint effects of all levels of education are highly significant (F[3,51] = 6.75, p < .001). Second, the effect of work experience is also statistically significant at the .001 level. Each additional year of work experience brings about a 2% increase in income, net of other factors. Third, measuring the effect of redistributive power produces a surprising result: neither party membership nor administrative position has any independent effects on income. 15 In model 2 of Table 2 we see that although neither firm bureaucratic rank nor ownership directly affects employees' incomes, firm profit is a stronger predictor. If a firm's profit per capita increases by one unit (ten thousand yuan), its employees' income would be expected to increase by 48.0% (e 0.392 -1), net of the other variables. This is consistent with hypothesis 6 and our common sense: people working in more profitable firms tend to have higher earnings. The different effects of organizational characteristics suggest that while work units are still important in determining income (via profit), the redistributive influence that work-unit bureaucratic rank and ownership represent is no longer significant.
Results
Model 3 in Table 2 shows the difference between state and market firms. The increasingly negative coefficients of the interaction term between education and ownership suggest that education has stronger effects on earnings in market firms than in state firms. In market firms, the expected income for people with senior high school education is about 35.7% (= e 0.305 -1) higher than for people with junior high school education or less, whereas in state firms the corresponding figure is 7.5% (= e 0.305 -0.233 -1), net of the the other variables. Likewise, in market firms, the expected income for people with 3-year college education is 78.4% (= e 0.579 -1) higher than for people with junior high school education or less, while in state firms the difference is only 17.8% (= e 0.579 -0.415 ). Finally, in market firms the expected income of graduates of four-year colleges is 178.7% (= e 1.025 -1) higher than for those with no more than junior high school, whereas it is only 29.6% (= e 1.025 -0.766 -1) higher in state firms, net of other factors. Therefore, education makes much more difference to earnings for employees in market firms than in state firms. These differences are statistically significant. Thus, hypothesis 1 is verified: education has a stronger effect on employees' incomes in firms closer to the market.
There is no difference in the effect of work experience between state firms and market firms. Although the negative coefficient of the interaction term suggests that experience is more valuable in market firms than in state firms, the difference is very small and is not statistically significant. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is not supported. Seniority, denoted by work experience, is an important criterion of income distribution in the socialist hierarchy as well as in the market economy, as is confirmed by the positive, and statistically significant, main effect of experience. In sum, the hypotheses that marketization increases returns to human capital holds true only for education.
The difference in the effect of administrative position between the state and market firms is also statistically significant. The positive coefficient of the interaction term indicates that administrative position has more impact in state firms than in market firms. In market firms, the net effect of position is strongly disadvantageous with respect to income. 16 In contrast, in state firms, administrative position is still advantageous, although the effect is small. Net of other factors, those at departmental rank or higher have about a 4% advantage in earnings relative to those at lower ranks. This finding clearly supports hypothesis 3, that is, the influence of redistributive power declines with a firm's closeness to the market.
Party membership, another indicator of redistributive power, has a more positive effect on employees' incomes in state firms than in market firms. In market firms, party members actually have a disadvantage in income, net of other factors, though the difference is not statistically significant. This result lends some support to hypothesis 4, suggesting that redistributive influence is diminishing, even in state firms.
The above results confirm the pattern differences in income determination between state and market firms. A separate model for state firms is presented in model 1 of Table 3 . While education and work experience are still significant predictors, firm rank has no significant effect on employees' income even in the state sector, net of other variables. After a decade of economic reform, firm rank has no effect on income for any firm. This result is neither for nor against hypothesis 5. If firm rank is altogether unimportant, it cannot be less important in market firms than in the state firms.
Within the state sector, firm profit deserves further attention since firm profit is the main source of employees' bonuses. Table 3 shows, again consistent with hypothesis 6, that firm profits significantly increase incomes, net of other factors. If a firm's profit increases by one unit (10,000 yuan per capita), employees' earnings increase by 32.2%, net of the other factors. However, contrary to our commonsense view, high profit does not increase returns to education. In model 2 of Table 3 , the coefficients of the interaction terms between education and firm profit are negative, indicating that the effect of education decreases with the increase of firm profit. For those with a junior high school education or less, each additional unit in a firm's profit increases expected income by 52.3% (= e 0.421 -1), net of other factors. For high school graduates, the expected increase is only 46.4% (= e 0.421 -0.040 -1); for three-year college graduates it is 14.8%; and for four-year college graduates it is 6.5%. A Wald test shows that the interactions between education and profit are as a group statistically significant (F[3,40] = 4.52, p < .01). Therefore, we can conclude that, within the state sector, education is more influential in determining income in LPFs than in HPFs. Because HPFs are closer to market than LPFs, these results seem contradictory with hypothesis 1, which predicts that education has a stronger effect on income in firms closer to the market.
FIGURE 2: The Effect of State Firm Profit on Returns to Education
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This outcome may reflect the equalizing influence of bonuses, which -as noted above -are known to be more equally distributed within firms than base salaries. Figure 2 is consistent with this claim. Although incomes of all employees increase as profits increase, the effect of the greater increases for workers with little education discussed above is to equalize incomes in high-profit firms, in contrast to the large association between education and income in low-profit firms. Direct confirmation of this conjecture can be found in the Tianjin data, which includes separate measures of base salaries and bonuses (both cash bonuses and noncase welfare converted into cash equivalents); recall equation 1. Table 4 shows models for factors affecting base salaries, bonus shares, and total income.
In the equation for base salary (model 1), all variables affect the logarithm of base salary. However, in the equation for bonus shares (model 2), all levels of education have no significant effect. Still, the coefficients are higher for those with junior and senior high school education than for those with tertiary education, which implies that these groups tend to get higher bonuses relative to their base salaries. Second, with respect to age, the discrepancy between base salaries and bonuses is even more evident. While base salaries increase with age, age has a slightly negative, but significant, impact on bonus shares. Thus, senior employees tend to receive smaller bonuses relative to their base salaries. Each extra year of age decreases the expected logarithm of bonus shares by 0.010, net of the other factors. Finally, neither administrative position nor firm rank affects the size of the bonus share. In sum, bonuses are distributed more equally than base salaries.
The model for total income can be obtained by adding the coefficient for base salary to the corresponding coefficient for bonus shares, as is done in model 3 of Table 4 . In this way, the effects of human capital variables on total income can be decomposed into their effects on base salary and on bonus shares separately. Education determines total income inequality mainly through its effect on base salary, which is hierarchically distributed in socialist economies. A bonus share is not significantly affected by educational level and thus contributes little to the income inequality among different levels of education. Indeed, the standard deviation for base salary is 890 yuan, and the standard deviation for bonuses is 710 yuan (excluding six outliers). Therefore the findings by Walder (1990) and Xie and Hannum (1996) are to some extent reconfirmed here. This explains how education has less effect on total income in HPFs than in LPFs. The more profit a firm earns, the higher proportion of total income is due to bonuses. As a result, the effect of education on total income decreases.
Summary and Conclusion
To summarize, using two survey data sets, I have tested the hypotheses that in firms more proximate to the market, the influence of redistributive power (party membership, administrative position, and work-unit rank) declines and returns to human capital (education and work experience) increase. With respect to redistributive power, my results show that in the 10-city study, neither party membership nor firm rank has any net effect on income in any type of firm, and thus provide evidence neither for nor against hypotheses 4 and 5. However, administrative position (hypothesis 3) has a strong negative effect on income in market firms, but a slight positive effect in state firms, which is consistent with Nee's claim that the influence of redistribution declines as marketization proceeds. By contrast, two hypotheses regarding returns to human capital and especially to education are not fully supported by the evidence. While education (hypothesis 1) has a stronger effect on income in market firms than in state firms, within the state sector it is less influential in HPFs than in LPFs. Thus, the effect of education does not monotonically increase with a firm's proximity to the market. The positive effect of work experience on income does not differ by organizational type; therefore, hypothesis 2 is unsupported.
Although hypothesis 6 is not directly linked to the effects of market transition, it provides a key to understanding this process and explaining findings about the effects of redistributive power and human capital. Results show that individual income is positively associated with firm profit, the main source of employees' bonuses. The analysis based on the Tianjin data confirms that bonuses, derived from firm profits and allocated more equally than base salaries, may account for the lower returns to education in HPFs than in LPFs.
Market transition theory predicts that the influence of redistribution decreases and that returns to human capital increase as a redistributive economy moves to a market economy, and that overall income inequality declines in the initial stage of the transition and later increases. My findings suggest that while redistributive power has declined, returns to human capital have not increased monotonically. Furthermore, the fact that education has a greater effect on income in market firms than in state firms favors market transition theory (Nee & Cao 1995) . However, within state firms, in contradiction to market transition theory, the effect of education on total income declines with the proximity of a firm to the market. This effect is exactly what Xie and Hannum (1996) found, even though they may have used an inappropriate indicator (growth rate of GDP) to measure the level of marketization.
My findings partially confirm Nee's description of distinctive patterns of social stratification in the state and market sectors (Nee 1996; Nee & Cao 1995) . While confidently claiming that market transition theory is strongly supported in the market sector, Nee has been ambiguous on whether it was confirmed in the state sector. Not all evidence unfavorable to market transition theory can be attributed to residues of the redistributive system. The effect of education on income is a good example. Higher returns to education are not limited to market economies. Socialist societies are credential societies, in which more highly educated people are also favored, at least in base salary. 17 In the prereform period, education was also an important source of income inequality and a major mechanism of social mobility (Walder 1995; Zhou 2000a ). Since firm profits had little impact on individual income and a national wage table governed all firms, the effect of education on income was considerable, and could be clearly seen within each work unit. In contrast, as the economic reform took effect, differences among work units in the profits made and retained have increased. Since the income gap among individuals working in different work units is largely due to differences in bonuses, which are distributed relatively equally within work units, the within-firm level of inequality has declined. 18 Thus, the declining effect of education on income in state firms is itself a consequence of the economic reform rather than the persisting influence of the old system.
My analysis of state firms also confirms the egalitarian trend in income distribution in China revealed by Xie and Hannum (1996) . It explains how income inequality declined in the initial stage of the market transition (Bian & Logan 1996; Griffin & Zhao1993; Nee 1989 Nee , 1991 Szelenyi 1978 Szelenyi , 1983 . Indeed, as Szelenyi and Kostello (1996) point out, it is implausible to argue that inequality declines, on the one hand, and returns to education increase, on the other. If highly educated people earn much more than people with lower education, the overall level of inequality in a society should increase rather than decline. According to Szelenyi and Kostello's institutional explanation, the effect of education logically should have declined in the initial stage of the reform and increased later (Szelenyi & Kostello 1996) . My findings about the different effects of education on income in concrete institutions substantiate their theoretical conjecture about returns to human capital. While redistributive influence declines, returns to education decrease at first but increase as marketization proceeds further. This is consistent with the trajectory of overall income inequality China has witnessed. In conclusion, studying the effects of marketization in specific institutional settings helps to explain the divergent findings from various sources and to resolve some issues in the ongoing debate.
Discussion: Toward a Substantive Institutional Analysis of Social Stratification in a Transitional Society
For a decade, market transition theory has stimulated a lot of intellectual exchange. The competing hypotheses and divergent findings so far have shown no sign of resolution. Nee's early formulation of market transition theory contains two interrelated parts: the declining influence of redistributive power and increasing returns to human capital (Nee 1989 (Nee , 1991 . Empirical studies have shown:
(1) the influence of redistributive power persisted and returns to human capital did not increase and sometimes increased (e.g., Xie & Hannum 1996) ; (2) the influence of redistributive power persisted but the returns to human capital increased (e.g., Bian & Logan 1996; Zhou 2000a) . My findings in this article, that the influence of redistributive power declined but returns to human capital did not increase (at least within the state sector), have further confounded the already divergent results.
Furthermore, there is hardly any agreement in interpreting those results. For example, proponents of market transition theory argue that theses of power persistence (Bian & Logan 1996) or power conversion have been incorporated into their theory (Cao & Nee 2000) . Others have contended that observations of increasing returns to education (human capital) cannot substantiate claims by market transition theorists because education was highly rewarded even in the pre-reform era (Zhou 2000a) . As Zhou (2000b Zhou ( :1193 comments: "when a theoretical debate generates more controversies than intellectual growth, it often signals that conceptual issues and theoretical logic are poorly defined and they are not widely shared among other scholars. Another contributing factor is that concepts and operationalization employed in empirical studies may no longer reflect the changing world." My reflections on the market transition debate are very much in agreement with Zhou's position.
Conceptually, the controversy is rooted in the dichotomy of state and markets. Market transition theory puts emphasis on the emerging market economy whereas competing theories focused on the continuing role of the redistributive state in shaping the social stratification order (Bian & Logan 1996; Parish & Michelson 1996; Rona-Tas 1994; Walder 1995) . This antithetical framework is espoused by most literature involved in the debate. The deadlock in the ongoing market transition debate implies that the division may have been improperly drawn. Zhou (2000a) has proposed a model of coevolution between politics and markets in the institutional transformation. The interaction between state and markets, nevertheless, still remains a black box. My work here moves a further step and offers a concrete institutional arrangement through which both political power and market forces must be implemented.
Empirically, two major explanatory variables (education and political attributes) representing the antithesis also deserve questioning. On the one hand, education is arbitrarily interpreted as a proxy for human capital in the market economy; hence its effect indicates the increasing importance of market mechanisms in generating inequality. However, educational credentials have significant effects on the allocation of resources and life chances in state socialist societies as well (Szelenyi 1988; Zhou 2000a ). On the other hand, the effects of party membership and cadre status, representing the role of the redistributive state, were indeed filtered by other intermediate institutions (e.g., Oberschall 1996; Walder 1990 Walder , 1995 .
While this article was initiated within the framework underlying the market transition debate, I do not intend to continue this debate because my findings add little to the messy substantive results. My results can neither be interpreted as supporting nor as refuting market transition theory. What we have learned from this debate is not a consensus conclusion but the deficiency of the framework that defines the division of the parties involved. This article focuses on the concrete institutions by which markets and political forces are coevolving in the actual process of the transition, and, by doing so, suggests a further step beyond a debate that has run its course. Perhaps the extent to which work units are redistributive and the extent to which they are marketized are intrinsically unmeasurable, but at least we shed light on the role the organization of work units plays in the distribution of income and other resources. Zhou (2000b) has called for substantive institutional analyses of the actual process of social change ongoing in former state socialist societies. This article is an effort in this direction. Notes 1. Walder does not explicitly make this point. However, he states: "since bonuses and other income are the components that have increased greatly in recent years, we can view their effects as one way of representing the impact of reform on income inequality" (Walder 1990:155) . This is my interpretation of Walder's results.
2. According to the China Statistics Yearbook, in 1993 there were 109 million workers employed in the state sector, accounting for 74% of the total urban working population. Meanwhile, in the economic sector (excluding government and nonprofit institutions) there were 104,700 state work units, 1,803,600 collective work units, and 32,100 other work units. State firms hired 45 million workers, that is, 68% of the 66 million workers in the economic sector (SSB 1996). 3. These firms include joint-owned, share-holding, foreign-funded, overseas Chinesefunded, and domestic private firms (SSB 1996). 4. Typically, a specific percentage of the retained profit (3% to 10%) is transformed into the "work-unit welfare fund." Using the welfare fund, the work unit purchases housing units and other items and allocates them to employees. Employees have to pay for these goods, but at a price lower than the market price. This is called collective consumption (Bian 1994) . Collective consumption is an important aspect of the impact of the work unit on economic inequality. Unfortunately, I do not have data on this aspect. The following analysis focuses on bonuses, the part of retained profits which is directly distributed to employees in cash. In the Tianjin data (see a description below), respondents reported the monetary values of in-kind goods they received from work units; I treat these as part of the bonus.
5. Although government agencies and nonprofit organizations are also called "work units," the attributes of work units described above typically refer to enterprises, or economic work units. In this article, I use the terms firms and economic work units interchangeably.
6. Others indicators are the proportion of products produced according to state plans, whether the product price is determined by the government, the amount of sales revenue, whether there is a dual-price system, and adaptations in organizational forms, each of which captures some of differences between semiredistributive firms and redistributive firms.
7. Firms that are publicly owned but enjoy few redistributive advantages, such as "small collective enterprises," are coded as "market firms." 8. The cities were Shenyang, Beijing, Baoding, Shijiazhuang, Luoyang, Wuhan, Lanzhou, Chengdu, Suzhou, and Guangzhou.
9. Many recent studies have been limited to data collected in Tianjin. Since Tianjin has lagged behind other areas in economic reform, findings in Tianjin may not represent the situation in China as a whole. For example, in previous Tianjin-based studies, administrative position and work unit rank have been found to significantly affect employees' incomes (Bian 1994; Bian & Logan 1996; Walder 1990 ). However, in the present study, this is not the case, probably because the sample of cities includes eastern coastal areas, such as Guangzhou and Suzhou, where the reform is more advanced. 10. A reviewer questioned whether this result simply reflected greater income inequality between firms in the market sector. To test this possibility, I computed the mean across firms of the standard deviation of income within each firm, in the market sector and the state sector respectively. The mean within-firm standard deviation is 996 yuan in the market sector, and 788 yuan in the state sector, suggesting that within-firm inequality is higher in the market sector.
11. There are actually several ways to solve the sampling problem. The Huber correction estimation command in STATA is:
regress [dependent variable] [independent variables], robust cluster(work unit id). The robust and cluster options relax the independence assumption and require only that the observations be independent across the clusters. The coefficients are identical to OLS regression, but the standard errors are adjusted. This is called the Huber correction for standard errors, or robust estimation of variance (not robust regression).
12. Conventionally, the human capital model should include both work experience and the square of work experience. I first estimated the model with a squared term. However, since the squared term was not statistically significant, I dropped it in the interest of parsimony.
13. Conceptually, I have distinguished HPFs from LPFs: HPFs are more profitable than LPFs. However, since firm profit is a continuous variable, a suitable cutting point between LPFs and HPFs is not at all obvious. Therefore, instead of dividing state firms into distinctive groups at a cutting point of profit, I treat firm profit as a continuous variable that interacts with individual variables.
14. To build discrete models for base salary and bonuses, some scholars have used log(Y 1 ) and log(Y 2 ) (Bian & Logan 1996; Knight & Song 1993; Walder 1990 ). However, this approach is somewhat problematic because it excludes those respondents with no bonuses. Arbitrarily assigning a small number to replace zero value is also problematic.
15. A univariate analysis shows that administrative position does affect natural log of income at a conventional level of significance. However, after the human capital variables are included, it is no longer significant. This suggests that the zero-order association between position and income (r = .16) is a spurious consequence of differences in the human capital of administrators and others: well-educated and senior employees are more likely to be promoted to administrative positions.
16. This result seems to be in complete contrast to what has been found in other countries. It may be because administrative position is closely related to, but not identical to, job position. The former denotes one's personal rank in the socialist hierarchical system and the latter denotes rank in terms of work responsibility. While job position is only applicable when a person is holding a job, administrative position, once acquired, is transferable across work units within the redistributive system. Inconsistency between job position and administrative position is possible within work units.
17. Formal education carries not only human capital, but also cultural capital (credentials). As Szelenyi has pointed out (1988), bureaucratic redistributive systems reward cultural capital more than human capital. Because in China only degrees from three-year colleges (dazhuan) or more (benke) are considered important credentials, the findings that only tertiary education has a significant impact on income can be interpreted in this way (See Peng 1992).
18. Take a simple example involving two employees (A and B) in a single work unit. In base salary, A earns $2 and B earns $1. A earns twice as much as B. Suppose both of them receive a $1 bonus. After the bonus, A earns $ 3 while B earns $2. A earns only one and half times as much as B. Inequality declines. Indeed, dividing state firms in the first data set at the mean profit for state firms (.36), the descriptive statistics shown in Table  1 suggest that employees in HPFs generally receive a high level of income compared to their counterparts in LPFs because HPFs are able to pay higher bonuses. However, the income variation (standard deviation) among employees in HPFs is less than that in LPFs, indicating that income inequality in HPFs is lower than in LPFs.
